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Non-Human Knowledge and Non-Human Agency
Hans-Johann Glock
My project is to compare human and non-human animals (henceforth
simply animals) with respect to knowledge. More generally, I shall con-
sider the applicability to animals of epistemic concepts like knowledge,
belief, perception, etc. These epistemic concepts are intimately connect-
ed to what one might call practical concepts— action, agency, inten-
tion, reason for acting, etc. For one thing, the most basic function of
epistemic concepts is to explain and justify action; for another, the no-
tion of a reason plays a central role in both the epistemic and the prac-
tical sphere. Accordingly, my exploration of animal knowledge will be
intertwined with a discussion of animal agency. Of course, both episte-
mic and practical concepts are also connected to mental notions in gen-
eral, of which they form important sub-classes.
Traditionally, knowledge or cognition is counted among the ‘high-
er’ mental faculties, as opposed to conative or emotive ones. In recent
years, however, there has also been a tendency in some quarters to dis-
sociate the term ‘cognition’ from any mental connotations. Ironically,
this trend derives from the so-called cognitive revolution. Although
they abandoned many of the methodological restrictions of behaviour-
ism, cognitive scientists continued to look askance at mental phenomena
like consciousness, which appear to defy scientific investigation because
of being irreducibly private. This qualm is based on an untenable, Car-
tesian conception of the mind, however1, and I shall assume that epis-
temic or cognitive phenomena form part of mental phenomena.
Now, there are two opposing stances on animal minds. Differential-
ists maintain that there are crucial qualitative differences separating us
from animals; assimilationists insist that the differences are merely quan-
titative and gradual. The most important variant of differentialism is lin-
gualism. It denies on a priori grounds that animals without a language can
have mental capacities at all, or at least ‘higher’ mental capacities like
those required for knowledge and rational agency. This raises the ques-
tion of whether there are conceptual connections between the posses-
1 See e. g. Glock (2001b).
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sion of language on the one hand, and the possession of mental capaci-
ties in general and cognitive capacities in particular on the other. Be-
cause I am interested in these connections, I shall focus on animals with-
out language, leaving aside the hotly contested question of whether some
animals are capable of acquiring rudimentary symbolic skills. It is not my
ambition, however, to tackle all the lingualist objections against credit-
ing animals with mental powers. I have repudiated many of them else-
where2, and shall focus here on those connected to knowledge and
other epistemic concepts.
I approach these topics from the perspective of recent revisionionist
ideas in epistemology and theory of action. In my view, these ideas un-
dermine certain forms of differentialism-cum-lingualism, since they re-
move apparent hurdles to accepting animal knowledge and agency.3 As
regards knowledge, if knowledge is not true justified belief, then animals
cannot be excluded on the grounds that they lack the rational faculties
that might be prerequisites for being justified. As regards agency, if rea-
sons for action are not subjective mental states but objective features of
the subject’s environment, then animals may be capable of acting for a
reason without possessing demanding types of self-consciousness, viz.
awareness of their own mental states. At the same time, the revisionist
ideas throw up new challenges to assimilationism, some of which I hope
to meet. This paper focuses on epistemic concepts. I shall briefly discuss
agency at the beginning, however. For epistemic and practical concepts
need to be seen in conjunction. And the most important weakness of
differentialism is that the basic connections between the two apply to
animals no less than humans.
2 Glock (2000) and (2010).
3 Another area in which the comparison can yield fruits concerns the role of
agency for cognitive states. With much fanfare, Fodor has trumpeted the
view that cognitive states like knowledge and belief are independent of and in-
deed prior to action and conative states like intending or desiring. The animal-
human comparison instead favours the loosely-speaking pragmatist view that
we should understand mental states in the context of human and non-human
practice. At the same time, one ought to resist a tendency among some recent
pragmatists, notably Brandom, namely of drawing a distinction between human
practice and animal behaviour that is so sharp and categorical as to rules out the
possibility of intermediate stages and hence the possibility of providing a genetic
(evolutionary) explanation of the emergence of evolved human knowledge and
action.
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I. Methodological Prolegomena
Knowledge and agency have been proposed as prerogatives of humans,
the former in conjunction with thought, the latter under a variety of
headings, which include not just action but also praxis and volition. In-
deed, some authors give the impression that their accounts of knowl-
edge, action or rational action are motivated at least partly by a desire
to ensure that they are beyond the of for animals.4 In some philosophers
one also suspects the opposite tendency, namely to explain various no-
tions of agency, in particular, in such a way that they are attainable for
animals, because of moral implications. Neither strategy commends it-
self. If the questions of whether animals can know or act are to have
any point, these notions must not be construed ab initio so as to imply
either a negative or a positive answer. Rather, they should be construed
in ways that are plausible or fruitful on independent grounds.
In this context it is not just legitimate but imperative to start out
from the ordinary use of ‘know’ and ‘act’, as well as their cognates
and equivalents in other languages. In pursuing any question of the
form ‘What is X?’ we shall inevitably rely on a preliminary notion of
X, an idea of what constitutes the topic of our investigation. In our
case we presuppose a preliminary understanding of knowledge and
agency. This is not a fully-articulated conception, which would have
to emerge from the subsequent debates in epistemology or theory of ac-
4 Thus Alvarez maintains that the only motivating reasons are facts (e. g. Alvarez
2010, 3, ch. 4). She grants that we can answer the question ‘Why are you V-
ing?’ by citing a goal. Yet she resists the suggestion that goals can be motivating
reasons on the following grounds: ‘If goals were reasons, it would follow that
any animal that acts in pursuit of a goal would also act for a reason. But whereas
it is fairly uncontroversial that a dog who digs in order to find a bone acts in
pursuit of a goal, it is much more controversial to say that the dog acts for a
reason: that what motivates the dog to dig is a reason, namely that digging is
a means to find the bone, and that the dog acts guided by that reason’. (Alvarez
2010, 98). But the passage up to the colon simply assumes that reasons should
not be the sort of things for which animals can act. Yet it is perfectly unexcep-
tional to say that the reason why the dog digs is that it is looking for a bone.
And the passage following the colon does not provide an independent argument
against such statements. Even if it is problematic to say that the dog is motivated
by the fact that digging is a means to find the bone, this gloss of ‘the dog has a
reason/is guided by a reason’ is forced on us only on the very assumption that
the argument purports to justify, namely that goals cannot be reasons, since only
facts can be reasons. There is nothing amiss with ‘The dog has a reason for dig-
ging, namely its goal of finding a bone’.
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tion, but an initial idea of what those debates are about. Such a pre-
theoretical understanding is embodied in the established uses of the rel-
evant epistemic and practical terms.
One might object that for philosophical and scientific purposes we
need to graduate from ordinary use towards a more specialized one
based on more exacting scrutiny of the phenomena. But this is not an
objection to my procedure. First, unless the relation between the
novel and the established ways of using the pertinent expressions (be-
tween the new and the old concepts) is properly understood, the phil-
osophical problems associated with these expressions will merely be
swept under the carpet.5 Secondly, all neologisms and conceptual mod-
ifications, those of science included, need to be explained. By pain of
regress, this can ultimately be done only in terms of ordinary expressions
which are already understood. Finally, the term ‘ordinary use’ is ambig-
uous. It may refer either to the standard use of a term as opposed to its
irregular use in whatever area it is employed, or to its everyday as op-
posed to its specialist or technical use.6 My starting point is the standard
use. Both the explanation of epistemic and practical concepts and claims
about their applicability to animals should in the first instance be meas-
ured not against philosophical theories, but against the uses of the rele-
vant terms in established and legitimate forms of discourse. In our case,
the latter will include everyday parlance; yet they will also include spe-
cialized disciplines from the behavioural sciences, the social sciences and
jurisprudence.
Now, we freely apply a wide range of epistemic and practical con-
cepts to higher animals and non-linguistic humans. This is not just an
indispensible part of everyday life, but also central to disciplines like
comparative psychology, cognitive ethology and developmental psy-
chology. This fact provides at least a prima facie reason against explain-
ing these concepts in ways that preclude such applications. A lingualist
has the following options for responding to this fact.
First, he can adopt an error theory, maintaining that ordinary folk
and scientists are simply mistaken in crediting animals with epistemic
and practical properties. Now, it is possible to regard the ascriptions
of some epistemic and practical concepts to some species of animals as
5 Strawson (1963).
6 Ryle (1953), 301–304.
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empirically false.7 But it is not easy to see how one could regard the as-
cription of all types of epistemic and practical concepts to all species of
animals as empirically false.
In any event, most lingualists adopt a second line. They often regard
such attributions not as false, but as suffering from a more basic defect,
namely that of being meaningless, nonsensical or based on a category-
mistake.8 If the concept of thought is such that it precludes application
to non-linguistic creatures, nothing could count as evidence that some
animals have thoughts. Ascribing thoughts to animals would then make
no more sense than ascribing a colour to a number. Yet it remains a
mystery how we could be so fundamentally confused about such basic
concepts, not just when language is idling, as in philosophical reflection,
but also when it is fruitfully employed, as in everyday discourse and pro-
gressing empirical sciences.
These days, the harsh charge of nonsense has given way to a third
response. Even though some thought ascriptions to animals are neither
empirically false nor straightforwardly conceptually incoherent, the story
goes, they cannot be taken literally, but must be regarded as figurative,
metaphorical or secondary. We are dealing with a possibly useful but ul-
timately incorrect faÅon de parler. This stance is illustrated by Davidson’s
reaction to a well-known tale from Norman Malcolm.
Suppose our dog is chasing the neighbor’s cat. The latter runs full tilt to-
ward the oak tree, but suddenly swerves at the last moment and disappears
up a nearby maple. The dog doesn’t see this maneuver and on arriving at
the oak tree he rears up on his hind feet, paws at the trunk as if trying to
scale it, and barks excitedly into the branches above. We who observe this
whole episode from a window say, “He thinks that the cat went up that oak
tree”.9
Malcolm claims that we would be right to say this, and Davidson ac-
knowledges that it is prima facie plausible. Nevertheless, he insists that
‘strictly speaking’ Malcolm’s dog cannot believe anything, because he
does not possess a language.10 An immediate objection to Davidson is
this: animals must be capable of having thoughts because we have no
better way of explaining and predicting their behavior than by attribut-
7 This is the case, for example, when ethologists like Seyfarth and Cheney (1996),
340–343 use observations to deny that vervet monkeys have a “theory of
mind”, that is, beliefs about the beliefs of conspecifics.
8 E.g. Stoecker (2009), 268; cf. Fisher (1996), 4–8.
9 Malcolm (1972–73), 13.
10 Davidson (2001), 96–100.
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ing thoughts to them.11 Indeed, there may not even be a feasible alter-
native. In that case, such attributions would even satisfy a well-known
methodological principle of comparative psychology. According to
’Morgan’s canon’, we should only attribute higher mental capacities
to a creature if this is the only explanation of its behavioural capacities.12
A fourth and last ditch attempt grants this point, while insisting that
some claims that are strictly speaking false are nonetheless indispensi-
ble.13 But this strategy requires a compelling explanation of how false-
hoods can be indispensible not just for practical purposes, but also for per-
fectly respectable scientific disciplines like cognitive ethology. Further-
more, it not only needs to specify what it is about our extant concepts
that precludes their literal application to animals, but also to explain why
competent speakers are so blissfully ignorant of this inapplicability.
If these four responses indeed fail, one is entitled to hold it against an
analysis of certain practical or epistemic concepts if it precludes their ap-
plication to animals.14 Of course, there may be good reasons for modify-
11 See, e. g. Bennett (1976), §§7–8; Fodor (1975), ch. 1.
12 See Morgan (1894), 53 ff.
13 Stoecker (2009), 256, 268.
14 Thus Stoecker proposes that ‘actions … are just those of our doings that are due
to our ability to align whatever we do to the call of reason, materialized in the
call of the social practice’ (Stoecker 2009, 267). He rightly infers from this
premise that animals cannot act. But surely that conclusion simply counts
against the premise. It goes to show that the proposed analysis is extensionally
inadequate, and for a variety of reasons. It precludes not just inanimate objects,
animals and fictional creatures like Davidson’s swampman (see Glock 2003,
262 f.), but also human beings who have not participated in a linguistic social
practice—such as feral children. The mere fact that Kaspar Hauser grew up out-
side of a linguistic community would not lead us to deny that he acted when he
fled from captivity; and we have no reason to adopt such a restrictive stance
simply because it follows from popular theories advanced by some externalists
and communitarians. Finally, Stoecker’s argument in defence of his premise is
laudable in refusing to treat reasons as subjective mental states. Yet it is faulty in
several respects. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that ‘reasons basically are
arguments’, and that in a reason explanation ‘we say that the agent has acted
because a particular argument spoke for her acting as she did’. Stoecker next
tries to avoid reference to the agent’s belief that something indeed speaks for
her action by adding the assumption that ‘I am wont to do what is arguably
the best’. It is unclear how this move can avoid the objection that in error
cases reference to the agent’s belief is mandatory. Worse still, Stoecker main-
tains that the only way of explaining why someone is wont to do what is argu-
ably the best is that he has been ‘raised in a social communicative practice’
(Stoecker 2009, 266). But this is a non-sequitur, since Stoecker does nothing
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ing our established epistemic and practical concepts. But this does noth-
ing to salvage the lingualist case. For one thing, it provides no grounds
whatever for answering questions like ‘Can animals possess knowledge?’
and ‘Can animals act?’ in the negative. For those questions are phrased
in the extant, non-modified concepts. For another, assuming the indis-
pensability of epistemic and practical notions that can be applied to an-
imals, such conceptual reform has little to recommend it.
Rather than dismissing our established ways of describing and ex-
plaining animal behaviour as false, confused, metaphorical, attenuated,
etc., one ought to consider the following option. In their established
uses, our epistemic and practical terms have more or less demanding
senses. In the less demanding ones they simply do apply to animals pe-
riod, whereas in the more demanding ones they may not.15 And at least
prima facie, it is more plausible to regard the simple senses as basic rather
than secondary or degenerate.
to rule out alternative explanations. Finally, intelligent animals are just as wont
to do what is arguably the best in the situations facing them as talkative yet thick
humans in situations facing them. Even if all of these points could be waived,
however, the argument would at best lead to the conclusion that animals cannot
act for a reason. There are other bona fide types of action, notably actions that
are subject to teleological explanations without being amenable to rational ex-
planations (see Glock 2009, 239–244 and Alvarez 2010, 191–196).
15 My position here has points of overlap with Ernst’s discussion of knowledge
(2002), which I read only after finishing the first draft of this paper. He does
not discuss the question of whether animals can possess knowledge. And instead
of distinguishing between more or less demanding senses of ,know’ he distin-
guishes between a sense in which we ascribe the term from the perspective
of someone already in the know, and a sense in which we ascribe it from the
perspective of somone who does not and seeks a reliable source of information.
But the former sense is less demanding, in that it requires no more than true
belief. And Ernst’s discussion is grist to my mill in that from the perspective
of someone in the know who either needs to decide whether to provide infor-
mation or to explain behaviour, we have no qualms about distinguishing ani-
mals with from those without knowledge. If the dog has already seen the
bone I placed in the bowl for its consumption, I don’t need to point it out
to him. And if Malcolm’s dog does not know that the cat went up the
maple, that explains why it is barking up the wrong tree.
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II. Animal agency
Practical notions like act, action, agency, intentional action, action for a
reason illustrate this point. They are notoriously complex and diverse.
The only sensible strategy is to distinguish between different senses of
the relevant terms, and to consider their applicability to animals. In
what follows, I can only provide an exceedingly brief sketch.16
The most general question in this area runs: Can animals act? That
general question must be answered in the affirmative by those revision-
ists who accept non-intentional agency, including agency by inanimate
objects. If
(1) The wind knocked over the vase
and
(2) The bleach ruined the linen
report agency in this general sense, then so do
(3) The cat knocked over the vase
and
(4) The dog ruined the linen.
At a grammatical level, we apply an active/passive distinction to many
kinds of inanimate objects. When it comes to living things, that distinc-
tion takes on a new foundation in reality. For here we can distinguish
between what an organism does and what happens to it by reference
to the organism’s needs. Thus plants fulfil their needs by growing
roots, orienting their leaves, emitting chemical substances to deter pred-
ators, etc. By contrast, they are subjected to various things that are neu-
tral to or detrimental to these needs.
When it comes to animals, we encounter not just needs but also
wants (goals and purposes). And here the aforementioned distinction ap-
plies with a vengeance. An animal can be thrown over a fence or trip
accidentally, or it can jump over a fence or fall to the floor obeying
an order. In the former case, it is not just needs that remain unfulfilled,
certain wants desires of the animal are frustrated or thwarted. And such
frustration, just like the fulfilment of the wants, is manifest in the ani-
mal’s behaviour.
It is points like this that underlie a prominent psychological defini-
tion, according to which action is simply behaviour directed towards a
16 See Glock (2009).
Hans-Johann Glock564
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 27.11.17 15:54
goal.17 According to a venerable philosophical tradition, by contrast,
human agency goes beyond this level. It is behaviour that has been
caused by a special kind of mental event, a volition. Now, it is far
from obvious that one cannot credit animals with volitions in the
sense of decisions. After all, there are animals that are not just intelligent,
but whose bodily demeanour, facial expressions and activities resemble
some of ours, notably the great apes. In these, at least, trained observers
can easily detect states of indecision. For instance, one can note how
characteristic activities are interrupted by obstacles and problems, how
these interruptions are followed by inactivity and characteristic displace-
ment activities and gestures (including the proverbial scratching of
heads), and how at the end of the behavioural cycle problem solving ac-
tivity ensues. Nevertheless, the voluntarist tradition in action theory is
less accommodating to animal agency than the current orthodoxy.18 Ac-
cording to that orthodoxy, the most fundamental feature of human
agency is that it is intentional. And that in turn is taken to mean that
it is subject to intentional explanations—explanations that refer to the
agent’s reasons—her beliefs, desires, intentions, goals, purposes, etc.
Animal behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, precisely
because animals are capable of acting purposively or intentionally, in pur-
suit of their own goals. The question that has been hotly disputed re-
cently is whether they are capable of acting for a reason. According to
orthodoxy reasons are subjective mental states. This implies that acting
for a reason requires the capacity to reflect on one’s own mental states.
That is a high hurdle. For revisionists, by contrast, reasons are objective
conditions—facts, states of affairs, etc. In so far as animals have cognitive
capacities, they have access to such objective conditions. And in so far as
the deliverances of these capacities guide their behaviour, they are capa-
ble of acting for reasons. But revisionists of a differentialist inclination
balk at that suggestion. For instance, it has been suggested that animals
might be said to act for a reason, a.k.a. goal, without having a reason,
since they cannot reflect on these reasons. Two assimilationist responses
suggest themselves: one is to question the idea that one can have reasons
only if one can reflect on these reasons; the other is to argue that animals
can reason or reflect on reasons.
17 See White (1979), 1.
18 Thus Stoecker (2009), 259 notes that it is more plausible to say that a cat intends
to stalk a bird than to say that it has decided to do so.
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This is not the place to resolve these issues. For us the crucial point is
that the applicability of intentional explanations to animal behaviour im-
plies the same connection between epistemic capacities—in particular
perception—knowledge, belief and action that one also finds in humans.
III. Intentional verbs
As is evident from intentional explanations, our epistemic and our prac-
tical concepts are intimately linked to intentional verbs. These verbs
occur mainly in three sentential forms:
I A Vs (knows/thinks/believes/expects, etc.) that p
II A Vs (intends/plans/means, etc.) to V
III A Vs (loves/desires/thinks about, etc.) X
According to an orthodoxy going back to Russell, the verbs that can re-
place ‘V’ denote different types of intentional attitudes, ‘A’ the subject of
these attitudes, and the substitution instances of ‘that p’, ‘to V’ or ‘X’
their contents. Statements of all three forms can display a hallmark of in-
tentionality, namely that nothing in reality needs to correspond to the
(grammatical) direct object: one can believe something which is not
the case, intend to do something which never happens, and love some-
one who does not exist.19 Prima facie, (I) expresses a propositional attitude,
(II) an action-oriented attitude, (III) an object-oriented attitude. Nonetheless it
is customary to subsume all forms of intentionality under the heading
‘propositional attitude’. This is no coincidence. There is a pervasive ten-
dency to regard (I) as basic and to disregard other forms of intentional-
ity, and this by itself gives succour to lingualists. For the term ‘proposi-
tion’ carries strong linguistic connotations. In some contexts, it is down-
right equivalent to ‘sentence in the indicative’, in others it signifies
something expressed by a sentence and (perhaps) designated by a that-
clause or more generally a noun-clause (see below).
However, I know of no compelling reduction of action- and object-
oriented attitudes to proposition-oriented attitudes.20 In the absence of
19 Some intentional verbs may not display this feature, in particular in type III
contexts. For instance, it is a moot question whether one can regret things
one has never done or know a person that does not exist.
20 McDowell (1996) may be right to reject ‘non-conceptual content’ if he means
to insist that every object we can identify perceptually can somehow be descri-
bed conceptually. It does not follow, however, that there is a list of propositions
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such a reduction, it is sheer dogmatism to insist that admiring Nelson
Mandela, intending to climb a tree or craving M&Ms are in the final
analysis attitudes towards propositions. Of course, the reasons people
have for admiring Mandela or intending to climb a tree can be expressed
through that-clauses. But so can the reasons people have for kicking a
ball, and no one would conclude that kicking a ball is therefore anything
other than a relation to an object. This removes an obstacle to crediting
animals with intentional states. For it would be foolhardy to deny that
chimpanzees can intend to climb trees or crave M&Ms, unless one is
in thrall to the prejudice that all intentional states must au fond be atti-
tudes towards propositions.21
which captures precisely and completely what I currently perceive—my visual
field. Tugendhat (1982), ch. 6 regards the reduction of all intentional states to
propositional attitudes as a distinctive trait of analytic philosophy. He defends
this stance on the grounds that even those intentional states which are ostensibly
directed towards objects, for example loving, pitying or admiring someone,
imply propositional attitudes, attitudes the expression of which involves a
that-clause. Even though Dorothea Brooke does not exist, I can admire her
only if I believe that she exists. And even if I picture Dorothea Brooke to myself
as a fictional character, I picture her as existing. But this argument is unconvinc-
ing. To be sure, to imagine an apple is not to imagine an apple as non-existing,
but neither is it the same as to imagine that there is an apple, which is what Tu-
gendhat needs to establish. Moreover, it is far from obvious that when I imagine
Dorothea Brooke, I imagine her as existing rather than as non-existing (provid-
ed that either of these options makes sense in the first place). Kenny (1963), chs.
V, XI steers a different course to a proximate destination. He maintains that
sentences where ‘I want’ is followed by a direct object (rather than by an infin-
itive), as in ‘I want an X’ can often be expanded into sentences of the form ‘I
want to V an X’: I want an apple – I want to eat an apple, etc. Furthermore, in
reports of what he calls ‘affective attitudes’ the grammatical object of the atti-
tude takes a different form depending on the verb: either a ‘that’ clause, or
an infinitive (I hope that p, I want to V ; I prefer to V, etc.). Nonetheless, he
maintains, they could all be expressed using the construction ‘A volits that p’,
since he thinks of these affective attitudes as taking an attitude to a state of af-
fairs. Although this would leave type (III) intentionality unaffected, it would
mean that type (II) cases could be reduced to type (I), and hence to something
propositional. But it is far from obvious that intending to do something is tan-
tamount to wanting a certain state of affairs to come about. It certainly doesn’t
amount simply to voliting that the results of the action come about. And even if
statements of the form ‘A wants to V’ could be paraphrased by statements of the
form ‘A volits that p’, it would not follow that the propositional construction is
more basic. For the possibility of paraphrase cuts both ways, and the infinitive
construction is much more readily understood than the propositional one.
21 Glock (2001); Alvarez (2010), 66 f.
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Let us nevertheless focus on intentional verbs of type (I), since here
the lingualist worry—the ‘proposition problem’—remains acute. Con-
sider a belief ascription such as:
(5) Carl thinks that the cat went up that oak tree
On the one hand, there is the intentional verb (‘believes’), which informs
us that Carl believes, rather than, for example, knows or fears that the
cat went up the oak tree. On the other hand, there is a noun-clause
(‘that the cat went up that oak tree’), which informs us of what it is
that Carl believes, the content of his belief, and is therefore known as
the content-clause. Switching to the material mode, there is the kind of
intentional state on the one hand, the kind of content on the other.
These two parameters are in turn connected to a well-known equivoca-
tion in nouns like ‘belief’, ‘hope’, ‘desire’, etc. ‘A’s belief’ can refer either
to what A believes, namely that the sun is out, or to what A has, namely the
belief that the sun is out. What A has, the belief, can be erroneous, sensible,
or tentative. But what A believes—e.g. that the sun is out—i.e. the con-
tent of her belief, cannot.22
The two parameters raise two distinct questions. One is which inten-
tional states can be ascribed—what intentional verbs can be applied to
animals; another question is which contents can be ascribed to them—
which that-clauses, singular terms, infinitives or gerunds can follow
these intentional verbs.23 Concerning the second question, Wittgenstein
famously maintained that a dog can believe that its master is at the door,
but not that its master will return the day after tomorrow. Concerning
the first question, he suggested that dogs are incapable of hope, because
that particular concept is applied on the basis of behavioural manifesta-
22 White (1972), 81 ff.
23 Stoecker (2009), 263 f. maintains that in reason explanations intentional atti-
tudes play second fiddle to the contents. ‘Except for the content, it does not
matter much, how we specify the type of attitude’. But the difference between
believing and knowing does play an enormous role, as we shall see. And so does
the difference between V-ing because one wants to and V-ing because one is
obliged to. Finally, there are not just ‘pro attitudes’—in Davidson’s terminolo-
gy—but also con attitudes. I can desire, etc., V-ing, yet I can also hate, resent,
deplore, etc. V-ing. It is interesting to note that with respect to negative con-
ative verbs the continuous form comes more natural than the infinitival. While
A can be said to hate to V, this is less natural than to hate V-ing, and resent to
V, deplore to V etc. may be ungrammatical. It would be interesting to speculate
whether there is a conceptual difference underlying this grammatical one.
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tions that are part of a ‘complex form of life’, that of linguistic humans.24
At a more general level, one might grant that animals can believe or per-
ceive that p, yet deny that they can think or judge that p, since these are
exercises of rational faculties. The next section is devoted to such a gen-
eral issue, namely the applicability to animals of ‘know’ and ‘believe’.
IV. Knowledge and Belief
Few contemporary differentialists would deny that some animals possess
knowledge how, in Ryle’s phrase. Intelligent animals know how to do
certain things, not just because they are genetically pre-programmed or
have been behaviouristically conditioned, but also because they can
learn how to do them off their own bats, whether by trial and error
or even through foresight and planning. The moot point is whether an-
imals are capable of what Ryle called knowledge that.25 It is obvious,
however, that the knowledge he had in mind is not tied to that partic-
ular grammatical construction. To know who, where, when or whether
also constitutes what is sometimes known as propositional knowledge—
a label that is highly misleading, as we shall see. Accordingly, if a dog
knows whether its master is at the door, it also knows that its master
is (not) at the door, and mutatis mutandis for knowing who is at the
door. If a chimpanzee knows where to find stones suitable for nut-
cracking, it also knows that such stones are to be found beneath yonder
tree. If a scrub jay knows when it has cached a supply of worms, it also
knows that the caching occurred so long ago that the worms are no lon-
ger edible. And since the antecedents are commonsensical or strongly
supported by empirical evidence, why should it be problematic to as-
cribe propositional knowledge to animals?
The problems, I submit, are largely the product of contestable phil-
osophical ideas about such knowledge. For proponents of orthodox ac-
counts, belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition of knowledge.
24 Wittgenstein (1967), 174.
25 That animals possess knowledge how rules out combining a differentialist denial
of knowledge that with the currently popular view that all cases of knowledge
how can be reduced to knowledge that. An interesting issue remains, however.
In the human case knowing how to V can be distinguished from the ability to
V. An old hunter may know how to skin a rabbit while no longer being able to
do so. But can this distinction be drawn in the case of animals? Not by refer-
ence to an old chimpanzee telling offspring how to crack nuts with a stone
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By the same token, the capacity for belief is merely a necessary condi-
tion of the capacity for knowledge. This obviously holds for the tripar-
tite conception of knowledge as true justified belief. On such an ac-
count, even if animals can believe that p, they could only know that
p if they were also justified in that belief. And if this in turn requires
that they are capable of justifying that belief 26, knowledge is unattain-
able for non-linguistic creatures.
The tripartite conception never recovered from the counterexam-
ples devised in Gettier’s article ‘Is justified true belief knowledge?’.27
Yet the idea that knowledge is a type of belief soldiered on, even
among many opponents of the tripartite concept.28 Given this assump-
tion, knowledge is belief plus something (justification, proper warrant,
suitable causal connection, etc.), and hence more demanding. The or-
thodoxy treats knowing as an ‘elite suburb of believing’.29 Following
Wittgenstein, Ryle and White, however, some epistemologists have
questioned the idea that knowledge is a species of belief. Instead, the re-
visionist story goes, it is a kind of ability. Thus Hyman has argued that to
know that p just is to be able to believe or do something for the reason
that p.30
But isn’t this from the frying pan into the fire for assimilationists, not
to mention their pets? For how can animals believe or do something for
a reason, without rational faculties? As indicated in section II, however,
it is far from obvious that a creature can only believe or do something
for a reason if it is capable of stating those reasons or to reflect on them.
Furthermore, if animals are capable of acting for a reason only in an at-
tenuated sense, the same might hold for their capacity to know. Finally,
if my methodological prolegomena are correct, then to the extent to
which an account of knowledge rules out cognitively controlled and
fruitful applications of epistemic concepts to animals, it also stands in
need of revision, e. g. in need of being restricted to humans.
To add force to this last point, the next section argues that crediting
animals with certain forms of knowledge is not merely legitimate but
inevitable, not just but especially if knowledge is a kind of ability. In
the following section I shall tackle a radical attack on orthodox accounts
26 A substantial if, see Glock (2009).
27 Gettier (1963).
28 E.g. Williamson (2000).
29 Ryle (1974), 5.
30 Hyman (1999).
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of knowledge. It questions an assumption that the orthodoxy shares
with its more moderate critics, namely that a creature that is incapable
of having beliefs must also be incapable of having knowledge. Accord-
ing to Marcus, animals can know things, yet they cannot believe things.
It will transpire that this claim is untenable. Furthermore, it is partly
based on a failure to question an orthodoxy in the philosophy of
mind, namely the aforementioned assumption that intentional verbs sig-
nify ‘propositional attitudes’, relations between a subject and a proposi-
tion.
V. Knowledgeable Brutes!
There are countless examples for everyday attributions of knowledge to
higher animals. If Malcolm’s dog had noticed the cat’s change of course
and behaved accordingly, we would have no qualms about
(6) The dog knows that the cat is in the maple tree
Cognitive ethology has added a wealth of more astonishing cases.31 In
many of them, there are legitimate disputes over how precisely to de-
scribe the animals’ achievements.32 But these concern the question of
what precisely the animals know and how they came by that knowl-
edge. That they do have knowledge of certain facts is not in dispute.
There are good reasons for this consensus. First, both everyday and
scientific observations demonstrate that animals have cognitive capaci-
ties, capacities to gain information. Indeed, some findings clearly indi-
31 See Bekoff/Jamieson (1996); Tomasello/Call (1997); Hurley/Nudds (2006).
Here is a selection. Chimpanzees know whether there is food in a container,
and not just through direct perception. They can pick the baited among two
containers, when they hear that another container shaken by the experimenter
doesn’t emit a characteristic noise. Chimpanzees know whether an experiment-
er will cooperate or not. They will point to the baited of two containers when
dealing with an experimenter that has been cooperative in the past, to the
unbaited, when dealing with an experimenter that has in the past appropriated
the indicated container. Scrub jays know not just where they have hidden food,
but also whether they have been observed doing so. What is more, they know
whether food hidden is still edible.
32 Is some kind of disjunctive inference in play the first case? Do the chimpanzees
in the second case know what the experimenters intend to do, or only how
they will react? Is the astonishingly intelligent behaviour of the scrub jays a
manifestation of episodic memory, etc.?
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cate that these capacities are not confined to perception. Still, perception
by itself suffices to show that animals are capable of gaining knowledge.
It would be absurd to deny that animals are capable of perception.
They can learn about their environment by using their sensory organs.
However, perceiving that p implies knowing that p, if ‘perceiving’ is used
as a factive verb, as it commonly is in both the human and the animal
case. Accordingly, since animals can perceive that p, they are capable
of knowing that p. Lingualists will contest the idea that seeing is know-
ing. But on what grounds? The most attractive option for them is to
argue as follows. Animal perception is confined to perceiving X, i. e.
to perceiving objects or events; it does not include perceiving that
p.33 This would mean that they are capable only of type III intention-
ality, not of type I intentionality. But this response is implausible. The
perceptually informed reactions of higher animals to their environment
can only be explained by a capacity to perceive that p. For instance, the
dog sees a bone on the table, but it has been trained not to grab anything
on the table and hence simply looks on, panting. Yet as soon as the bone
is placed on the floor, the dog grabs it. This sequence of events is not
explained by the dog simply seeing a bone, a table or the floor, but
only by its seeing first that the bone is on the table and then that it is
on the floor. One might maintain that the problem vanishes if spatial re-
lations like x being on y are among the objects that the dog can perceive.
However, simply perceiving three distinct objects—bone, table, x being
on y—does not explain the dog’s behaviour. Such an explanation is only
in the offing if the dog can also perceive that the bone stands in the re-
lation of being on to the table at one moment, to the floor at the next.
And in that case we are back with perceiving that p. Nor can the lingu-
alist defuse the argument by insisting that the dog simply perceives (sees,
smells, etc.) the bone on the table or the bone on the floor. For either the ap-
position ‘on the table’ is used restrictively to identify what bone it sees,
in which case the dog’s seeing the bone on the table goes no further to-
wards explaining its behaviour with respect to the table than its simply
seeing a bone. Or it is shorthand for ‘being on the table’. But perceiving
the bone being on the table is perceiving that the bone is on the table by an-
other name. Consequently there is no way around the admission that
animals can perceive that something is the case, just as we can.34
33 Thus Dretske, e. g. Dretske (2004) distinguishes between ‘seeing things’ and
‘seeing facts’, maintaining that only the latter is conceptual.
34 Glock (2010).
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Furthermore, animals display a kind of behavioural response to what
they have learnt through perception which is analogous to the human
case—a response appropriate to the circumstances. For instance, vervet
monkeys react in a characteristic fashion to different predators, and they
signal these different predators through distinctive alarm calls.35 Further-
more, a vervet monkey that has fled from a snake onto a tree knows that
it is safe. And we know that it knows because it is no longer agitated and
no longer signals danger, instead observing the snake in a detached, im-
passive fashion.36
Finallly, in higher animals we can detect the same nexus between
perception, knowledge and action that is crucial to the application of
epistemic and practical concepts to humans, especially according to re-
visionist accounts. Consider the following ingenious example by Mar-
cus, involving his cat Opie.37
(7) Opie tries to paw the pantry door open in order to retrieve the
treats.
(8) Opie paws the pantry door open because he is retrieving the treats.
(9) Opie paws the pantry door open because he is trying to retrieve
the treats.
(10) Opie paws the pantry door open because the treats are in the pan-
try.
If Opie fails to paw the pantry door open, (8) – (10) are out of order,
just as they would be in the human case. If Opie succeeds at pawing
the pantry door open, yet the pantry contains no treats, (9) is in
order, while (8) and (10) are not. For these explanations require knowl-
edge of facts. The analogy with human knowledge extends to Gettier
style cases, at least if these are dealt with along revisionist lines. Suppose
Marcus has moved the treats to the shelf above the pantry. The treats
then happen to fall behind the shelf and back into the pantry. Opie,
not having observed the switch and suffering from a stuffy nose, is un-
aware of these developments. In that case we might say
(11) Opie paws the door open because the treats are usually in the pan-
try
or
35 Seyfarth/Cheney (1996).
36 See Rundle (1997), 87.
37 Marcus (2011), ch. 3.
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(12) Opie paws the door open because he expects the treats to be in the
pantry.
But Opie doesn’t paw the door open because the treats are in the pantry
full stop, as in (10). For ‘[h]is expectation’s being met was merely fortu-
itous’.
VI. Incredulous Brutes?
Marcus rightly concludes that animals are capable of knowledge. Turn-
ing received wisdom on its head, however, he demurs at granting that
they are capable of belief. His line of reasoning can be reconstructed to
run roughly as follows.
(P1) Knowledge is a relation between a subject and a fact
(P2) Animals can be related (in an appropriate fashion) to facts
(C1) Animals can know things
(P3) Belief is a relation between a subject and a proposition
(P4) Animals cannot be related (in an appropriate fashion) to propositions
(C2) Animals cannot believe things
Although P1 and P2 require careful elaboration, we should accept C1, for
the reasons rehearsed in the last section. A rationale for accepting P4 will
emerge in section VIII. Right now I turn to the argument in favour of
P3, which Marcus derives from Vendler. According to both, ‘that’ claus-
es are systematically ambiguous between a fact-interpretation, and a
proposition-interpretation. ‘that p’ in ‘A believes that p’ always refers
to a proposition, whereas ‘that p’ in ‘A knows that p’ always refers to
a fact. This thesis rightly presupposes that facts and propositions are
not to be equated, their logical isomorphism notwithstanding. And
Vendler brings to light genuine differences between the roles of that-
clauses in belief- and know-strings, respectively. Consider
(13) John believes that grass is green.
(14) I know what John believes.
(15) I believe what John believes.
Vendler’s thesis is that ‘A knows ___’ takes facts as objects, whereas ‘A
believes___’ takes propositions as objects. Accordingly, ‘what John be-
lieves’ in (14) cannot refer to the object of John’s belief—the proposition
that grass is green—since the latter is not a fact. And sure enough, (14)
does not mean that I know that grass is green. Rather it means that I
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know that John believes grass is green, which is the fact expressed by (13) as
a whole. (14) is similar to
(16) I know what he lost.
in which ‘what he lost’ is a new sentence-nominalization—a ‘wh-nom-
inalization’ —of ‘that he lost a watch’. By contrast, ‘what John believes’
in (15) refers back to the proposition on display in (13), viz., that grass is
green. In this respect, (13) is similar to
(17) I found what he lost.
where ‘what he lost’ ultimately derives from a relative clause. (15) is tan-
tamount to
(15’) I believe that which he believes [namely, that grass is green].
The cases that cause trouble for Vendler’s thesis are those employing
two verbs, such as
(18) John believes what Mary knows
These mixed cases seem to show that belief and knowledge can have the
same object. Vendler dismisses (18) as ungrammatical. Yet that dismissal
seems theory-driven. In any event, no competent speaker would balk at
a slight modification:
(18’) John merely believes that p while Mary knows it38
Marcus for his part suggests that mixed cases trade on an ambiguity con-
cerning that-p, which is made to do double-duty, to refer to a propo-
sition in the first conjunct, a fact in the second. He assimilates (18’) to
cases of syllepsis such as
(19) Ron was still off his rocker and his medications.
Yet ordinary speakers would not regard (19) as a syllepsis, a potentially
comical crossing of categories. The addition of ‘merely’ to (18) does not
serve to cross a categorial divide—between propositions and facts. It
simply indicates that the sentence settles the ‘intra-categorial’ question
of whether what Mary is stated to know is that John believes that p
or rather that p.
Finally, the diagnosis of syllepsis is even less plausible for mixed cases
involving the same subject, such as
38 Marcus uses the example ‘I merely believe what John (truly) knows’, which
leaves one with a puzzle about how he could be in a position to state that
John knows that p yet credit himself with the mere belief that p.
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(20) She now knows what she used merely to believe, namely that exer-
cise is good for you.
Consequently, there is no case for holding that ‘that’-clauses are catego-
rially ambiguous in the way maintained by Vendler.39
Ironically, it is Vendler’s claim that what we know is always a fact
that runs up against categorial distinctions of standard English.
(21) A knows that p
does not imply
(22) A knows the fact that p (*)
Rather, it implies
(23) It is a fact that p
and arguably—if A possesses the concept of a fact—
(24) A knows that it is a fact that p.
We shall see below that matters stand even worse for the claim that what
we believe are always propositions.
VII. Retreat from Knowledge
It transpires that Vendler’s logico-grammatical considerations do not
rule out ascriptions of beliefs to animals. What is more, there is an ob-
vious problem with the idea that animals are knowers but cannot be be-
lievers, namely the problem of accounting for cases of error or mistake.
Animals possess cognitive, and in particular perceptual, faculties which,
properly exercised, yield knowledge about the environment. As Mal-
colm’s example illustrates, however, they can also exercise these cogni-
tive capacities in inadequate or insufficient manner. In that case, they do
not possess knowledge, even though their behaviour is still guided by
these faculties.40 Attribution of belief is in order, because in the case
of animals no less than in the case of humans, there is the possibility
of epistemic failure as well as success.
Small wonder, then, that even a differentialist like Rundle writes:
‘Certainly, we do no violence to language in speaking of knowledge
39 See also White (1982), 45–54; Dolby (2007), ch. 1.1.2.
40 Davidson has famously argued that a creature cannot have a belief without
being mistaken, and that this in turn requires possessing the concept of a mis-
take. The first claim is correct, the second mistaken. See Glock (2000).
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[in the case of animals], and, while it is not the most suitable term,
“think” has, …, an intelligible role in those cases where we are obliged
to retreat from “know”. After all, the move from knowledge to thought
or belief can hardly be a move to a state which is more problematic psy-
chologically, as it were, given that it is made solely on the strength of the
failure of a purely external condition’.41
The assimilationist needs to clear two obstacles at this stage. First,
isn’t the idea that in the case of epistemic failure we still have a case
of belief a lapse back into the orthodox account of knowledge as belief
plus something? The answer is: No! For we must distinguish between
the proper analysis of knowledge and the question of whether the capacity
for knowledge can be attributed without the capacity for belief. When A
knows that p, it is not a matter of A believing that p plus it being the case
that p plus something else. Nonetheless, only a creature that can (mere-
ly) believe that p can also know that p, since only such a creature has
cognitive capacities that play a role in explaining its behaviour. Indeed,
when it comes to explaining behaviour, we do not distinguish between
an explanation by reference to knowledge and an explanation by refer-
ence to mere belief. One and the same behaviour can be made intelli-
gible by A knowing that p and by A merely believing that p. That Sarah
called out the ambulance is rendered intelligible by her believing that
she has gone into labour, whether or not she is right.
The second obstacle is to account for animal belief in view of the
assumption that belief is a relation between a subject and a proposition.
Even Marcus describes the idea that we commit an error in attributing
beliefs to animals through statements like (5) as ‘charmless’. He thinks
that our hands are forced, however, on pain of accepting that animals
grasp propositions.
41 Rundle (1997), 89 f. To be sure, Rundle also insists that our ascriptions of belief
and thought to animals are not a matter of knowledge. ‘The dog believes that
there is a squirrel in the tree’—‘I am prepared to go along with that way of
speaking’. But his reason is that there is no internal process of thought which
the subject can manifest. It cannot be said that ‘something takes place in the
creatures head’ which might be reportable by a sentence (Rundle 1997, 90,
105). But this is an unduly mentalistic conception of thinking, at odds with
the insights of Ryle and oblivious to the array of thoughts that can be displayed
in non-linguistic behaviour.
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VIII. Propositional Attitudes’ and Animal Intentionality
The assumption that stands in the way of animal belief is P3, namely that
belief is a relation between a subject and a proposition. That assumption
is part and parcel of the orthodox picture of intentional states as relations
between subjects and propositions (a picture that Vendler and Marcus
reject for the case of knowledge yet accept for the case of belief).
That picture rules out ascriptions of beliefs to animals quite irrespective-
ly of Vendler’s logico-grammatical considerations. According to ortho-
doxy, what a subject believes (the content of A’s belief) is a proposition
or thought, a complex object of which concepts are the components;
thus the thought that dogs bark is a complex object of which the con-
cepts DOG and BARK are parts. By these lights, if A believes that p,
then she stands in relations of grasping and accepting to an entity, a
proposition, of which concepts are components. Thus orthodoxy pres-
ents a relational account of intentional states and a building-block model
of propositions.
As mentioned above, the term ‘proposition’ is closely related to
‘sentence’, to the ears of philosophers, linguists and laypeople alike. It
also suggests a claim or statement that is being proposed or advanced
for consideration. An attitude towards a proposition therefore seems
to require an understanding of something proposed, claimed or stated.
Furthermore, on most accounts, propositions and concepts are not
just linguistic but also abstract. Yet animals cannot stand in the appro-
priate cognitive/semantic relationship to such entities.42 Finally, on
the orthodox view even straightforward propositional contents such as
the one attributed in (5) include concepts like that of a cat or of a
tree. But there are difficulties in supposing that animals could grasp
and hence entertain these concepts.
One way of defusing the proposition problem is associated with
Fodor. According to him propositions and concepts are particulars in
the heads of individuals—notably sentences or words of a language of
thought—rather than abstract entities. And such particulars occur in
the brains of animals no less than in those of humans. Even creatures
that do not speak a public language partake of the language of
thought—provided their behaviour is explicable by reference to inten-
tional states. As I have argued elsewhere, however, that position is un-
tenable. Propositions and concepts cannot be particulars, since they can
42 See Glock (2010), 19; Alvarez (2010), 67; Marcus (2011).
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be shared between subjects. They are not signs, but what signs express.
And the idea of a language of thought falls foul of the fact that a linguis-
tic symbol is something that is used in a potentially conscious way by a
subject. The neural processes Fodor has in mind may charitably be in-
terpreted as causal enablers of thought, yet they cannot be symbols of a
language.43
IX. Nonconceptual Content?!
A more promising response to the proposition problem invokes the idea
of ‘nonconceptual content’.44 This response accepts that intentional
verbs signify attitudes towards objects of a special kind, namely contents ;
it parts company with lingualism by insisting that in addition to proposi-
tional contents consisting of concepts (the contents of human thinking)
there are also ‘proto-propositional’ contents consisting of nonconceptual
components, e. g. sensory representations (the contents of animal think-
ing and pre-reflective human perception). Unfortunately, it is unclear
how such proto-propositional entities can be contents of thinking as
here understood, i. e. contents signified by the noun-clauses in sentences
of the form ‘A Vs (perceives, believes, knows) that p’
Furthermore, this response to the proposition problem in turn leads
to a congruity problem. The distinction between different types of content
seems to count against ascribing one and the same belief to humans and
animals. It suggests that a statement of the form
(25) Both Sarah and the dog believe that p
is not so much a falsehood as a syllepsis. For ‘Sarah believes that p’ comes
out as ‘Sarah stands in the relation of believing to the thought that p’
while ‘The dog believes that p’ comes out as ‘The dog stands in the re-
lation of believing to the protothought that p’.
Such a conclusion would undermine the anti-lingualist motive for
introducing the notion of nonconceptual content. At the same time,
it seems to support lingualists like Marcus and McDowell.45 The latter
resists the idea that there is a ‘non-conceptual content’ common to
the perception of humans and animals (though not on account of the
43 Glock (2006).
44 E.g. Cussins (1992); Peacocke (1992); Dummett (1993), chs. 12 f.; Bermúdez
(2003).
45 McDowell (1996), 50 f., 63 ff.
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congruity problem). Instead, McDowell declares, animals are capable
only of ‘perceptual sensitivity’ rather than genuine experience. In a sim-
ilar though less dogmatic vein, Malcolm suggests that while the dog can
“believe” that the cat went up the oak tree, only humans can “have the
thought” that it went up the oak tree. Unfortunately, such a position is
faced with an unpalatable dilemma. Either it rejects outright the appli-
cation of intentional verbs terms like ‘perceives’, ‘thinks’ or ‘knows’ to
animals, thereby facing the objections marshaled in section I. Or it di-
agnoses a fundamental ambiguity in applying such verbs to humans
and applying them to animals. In that case, the congruity problem
once again raises its ugly head.
Irrespective of whether it arises on account of the content-clause or
on account of the intentional verb, the idea that there is such an incon-
gruity is at odds with the way in which ascriptions of beliefs to linguistic
and non-linguistic creatures interact. (25) is not a syllepsis like ‘Both the
exam and the chair were hard’. For it gives rise to perfectly legitimate
inferences and explanations. Particularly pertinent is that we can explain
a common reaction between Sarah and the dog by reference to state-
ments like (25). If both Sarah and the dog suddenly notice that there
is a precipice in front of them, for instance, this explains why both
stop dead in their tracks.
We should abandon the unwarranted assumption that an ascription
of a belief requires cognitive parity between the ascriber and the subject.
A certain disparity between the terms used in a belief report and those
that could be used by the subject is present even in the linguistic case,
without constituting a fundamental incongruity. The terms which
occur in the content-clause are in general dictated not so much “by”
the creature whose belief we report, but “by” the concerns of speaker
and audience. Thus, ‘Sarah thinks that the charlatan you introduced
me to is about to give her a biscuit’ can be in order, whether Sarah is
an adult who regards the person in question as a charlatan, one who
does not, a child that lacks the concept of a charlatan, or a dog.46
46 See Rundle (1997), 83.
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X. Doing away with propositional attitudes
The travails of both differentialism and nonconceptual assimilationism
count in favour of a more radical attack on the orthodox, relational ac-
count of intentional states epitomized by the idiom of propositional at-
titudes. Its popularity notwithstanding, the idea that an intentional state
is a relation between a subject and a proposition is problematic.
One set of difficulties concerns the building-block model of con-
tents (whether conceptual or nonconceptual). There are both empirical
and conceptual qualms about the idea that entertaining a part of a
thought correlates with a definite stage of a more protracted mental
or neuro-physiological process—the entertaining of the whole thought.
Even if these could be waived, we would only be dealing with stages of
thinking a thought, not with stages of thoughts. As regards the latter, the
building-block model transposes the part/whole relation from the spatial
and temporal sphere to a sphere—that of abstract entities—to which ex
hypothesis neither spatial nor temporal notions apply. What seems to give
sense to talk of parts and wholes in the case of propositions or thoughts
is the fact that the linguistic expressions of thoughts—namely senten-
ces—have components—namely words.47 What is said or thought can
be said to have components only to the extent to which its linguistic ex-
pressions have components (these components may, for instance, be
what A explains when she is called upon to explain what she means
by a particular utterance).
In the wake of Quine, many philosophers regard propositions as du-
bious entities. They are not just abstract but intensional, and hence, al-
legedly, lack criteria of identity. Such philosophers often replace prop-
ositions by sentences as the objects of propositional attitudes, thereby
committing themselves to lingualism. I am more inclined to challenge
an assumption which the orthodox view shares with Quinean exten-
sionalists and most proponents of nonconceptual content, namely that
intentional verbs signify relations to either abstract or concrete objects.48
47 See Kenny (1989), 126 f.
48 Davidson’s attitude towards the building block model is ambivalent. On the
one hand, he denies that having a thought is to stand in a relation to a propo-
sition, on the other, he sees no alternative to treating belief sentences like (1) as
relational (Davidson 2001, 37, 57 ff.). Stoecker (Stoecker 2009, 264) ignores the
former aspect in maintaining that for Davidson having an intentional attitude is
‘standing in a certain relation to a content’. Davidson’s measurement analogy,
to which Stoecker refers, is designed precisely to avoid this reification. Stoecker
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The idea of propositional attitudes is problematic not just on account of
‘propositional’ but also on account of ‘attitudes’. For the idea that belief
is a relation between a subject and an entity amounts to a reification.
Admittedly, noun-clauses like ‘that the cat went up the oak tree’ or
‘what Carl believes’ are grammatically speaking the objects of beliefs.
But they are intentional rather than object-accusatives.49
(26) Clare Short believes Tony Blair
entails that there is an object x such that Short believes x. In (26) the
psychological verb expresses a genuine relation, since here two relata
must exist, one to believe, and one to be believed. By contrast,
(27) Short believes that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction
does not entail that there is an object x such that Short believes x.Noth-
ing in reality need correspond to the noun-phrases of (5) and (27), since
the relevant state of affairs need not exist or obtain.50
A building-block theorist will dig his heels in and insist that some-
thing must exist, namely a (propositional) content which is a real object,
though probably an abstract one. But this ‘something’ is an object only
in a formal, grammatical sense; it is a projection from that-clauses rather
than a genuine thing to be encountered beyond space and time or in the
heads of individuals.51 Brentano was right to insist that to believe is to
believe something. (27) entails that there is something Short believes.
Yet in the first instance this simply means that Short cannot believe any-
thinks that some causal explanations do not refer to causes, and uses this to back
up the idea that rational explanations are causal even though actions are not
events caused by internal states. But his example of explanations referring to
quantitative states is awry. It is wrong to claim that the weight and speed of
a truck explain why it broke through the guard vails simply because they nar-
row down the scope of possible causal processes (as in an inference to the best
explanation). Rather, the fact that the truck had a certain impulse (which in
turn is a function of weight and velocity) explains the fact that it broke through
the barrier.
49 White (1972).
50 This is not the only criterion for an object-accusative, since otherwise factive
intentional verbs, as in ‘A knows that p’–would govern an object accusative.
For more on this point and the following argument see Glock (2010a).
51 Pace Quine, ‘something’ is wider than ‘object’. ‘Something’ is syntactically
transcategorial : it can quantify into the positions of singular term, predicate,
and sentence. Only in the first case is it equivalent to ‘object’. For the complex
relations between these expressions, as well as ‘exists’, ‘there is’ and ‘real’, see
Glock (2003), ch. 2.
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thing unless there is an intelligible answer to the question ‘What does
Short believe?’. If I say ‘I believe that p’ and this still leaves you in
the dark as to what precisely I believe, I can only respond with an elab-
oration of what I have said, rather than with a more accurate designation
of an object.
Furthermore, the wh-clause ‘what Short believes’, like ‘what Short
weighs’, incorporates an interrogative rather than a relative pronoun.
Thus ‘Prescott knows the person Short believes’ and ‘The person
Short believes is Blair’ entails ‘Prescott knows Blair’. Yet ‘Prescott
knows what Claire Short believes’ and ‘What Short believes is that
Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction’ does not entail ‘Prescott
knows that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction’, if only because
one cannot know a falsehood. Similarly, ‘Prescott knows what Short
weighs’ and ‘Short weighs 70 kg’ do not entail ‘Prescott knows
70 kg’, since that sentence is ungrammatical. Neither ‘what Short
weighs’ nor ‘what Short believes’ signify an object to which Short is re-
lated. By the same token, believing that p is no more a genuine relation to
an object than weighing n kilograms.
It might be objected that there are pertinent contexts in which
‘what Short believes’ does incorporate a relative pronoun. In conjunc-
tion with (27)
(28) Prescott believes what Short believes
entails
(29) Prescott believes that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction.
But the move to (29) is not underwritten by our knowledge that Short
and Prescott are related in the same way to an entity. Instead, it is under-
written by the fact that both share certain properties regarding a partic-
ular question, namely the question of whether Iraq possesses weapons of
mass destruction. Even in this context, ‘what Short believes’ is an inter-
rogative clause in a less direct sense, since its content derives from the
way in which Short would or could respond to a certain question, or
react in certain situations, e. g. when voting on the attack on Iraq in Par-
liament.
Non-Human Knowledge and Non-Human Agency 583
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 27.11.17 15:54
XI. Doing away with propositional attitudes
The building-block model also goes astray in assuming that the alleged
object to which subjects of intentional states are related is a proposition.
Many intentional verbs cannot be characterised as expressing a relation
either to a proposition or to a sentence. It makes no sense to expect,
fear, hope or see a sentence or proposition, at least not the same sense
as to expect, fear, hope or see that p. And given that what I can expect
or see is what you can believe, this difficulty may be contagious. That is
to say, it may show that even though it makes sense to believe the prop-
osition that p, believing that p is not the same as believing the proposition
that p.52
One might respond that in its philosophical usage, ‘proposition’ is a
term of art which is exempted from the vagaries of English that rule out
locutions like
(30) A fears/expects/hopes/sees the proposition that p.
But this invites the challenge to explain what precisely that technical
term means. And because of the illicitness of (30) that challenge cannot
be met by stipulating that propositions are simply what we believe, ex-
pect, hope, etc.53
On the other hand, the denial that what we believe is always a prop-
osition seems to imply that in cases in which we do believe the propo-
sition that p, we have two beliefs, a belief that p and a belief in the prop-
osition that p. And such duplication seems implausible. This objection
can be fended off as follows. To say that A believes the proposition
that p is not to ascribe to her a belief in addition to her belief that p.
Rather, it is to place her belief that p in a certain context. Believing
that p is simply a matter of believing something to be so, whereas believing
the proposition that p is a matter of believing something to be true. In the
case of simply believing that p, the focus is on how things are or might
be; in the case of believing a proposition that p it is on how they have or
might be stated or believed to be. The latter construction is appropriate
if something has been stated to be so or if such a statement is at least ‘in
the air’, with that statement then being up for consideration regarding
its truth.
52 See White (1972); Rundle (2001).
53 See Glock (2011).
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XII. Conclusion
As regards the basic epistemic and practical notions discussed here, my
arguments favour a middle stance between assimilationism and differen-
tialism-cum-lingualism.
On the one hand, the difference between humans and animals does
not lie in the fact that the former can and the latter cannot believe,
know or act. Nor does it lie in the fact that the latter can believe,
know or act only in an attenuated sense. It lies rather in the fact that
we can believe, know and do more.
On the other hand, this difference is derivative from our distinctive
language-using abilities. Something must count as believing, knowing
or desiring that p rather than that q, otherwise such ascriptions are vac-
uous. This means that intentional states, although they need not actually
be expressed, must be capable of being expressed. And only a restricted
range of intentional states can be expressed in non-linguistic behav-
iour.54
Furthermore, in this case a difference in quantity transforms into a
difference in quality—to use a Marxist figure of thought. This holds
at two levels. At the factual level, the emergence of language enabled hu-
mans to develop techniques and forms of interaction of unprecedented
complexity and sophistication. It permitted division of labour and pro-
gressive cultural development. And these have set the way humans act,
communicate and think—our way of life—fundamentally apart from
even the most intelligent and social of animal species. At the conceptual
level, the logical connections between epistemic and practical concepts
are greatly enhanced when they are applied to linguistic creatures. As a
result, in applying our epistemic and practical concepts to animals we
employ a rich conceptual apparatus in an area in which some of the log-
ical connections which constitute that apparatus do not apply. But at-
tributing knowledge and action to animals is not simply an impoverish-
ed application of a rich technique. For that richer technique evolves
around a central core of cases in which creatures believe, know, desire
and do things on account of their wants and cognitive capacities. These
basics of knowledge and action are shared by humans and animals.55
54 See Glock (1997).
55 For comments and suggestions I am grateful to David Dolby, Frank Esken, Tim
Henning and participants in the 2010 conference on Human Agency and
Human Knowledge at Peking University. I should also like to express my pro-
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